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Abstract—The paper presents a novel concept of processor
aimed at symmetric-key cryptographic applications. Its archi-
tecture is optimized for implementation of common cryptogra-
phy tasks. The processor has 128-bit separated data and key
registers, dedicated instruction set optimized for key generation
and management, embedded cipher, and embedded random
number generator. From an architectural point of view, the
most important characteristic of the proposed crypto-processor
is the physical separation of data and key registers and buses,
insuring that confidential keys will never leave the system in
clear. This way, the processor enables to separate protected
and unprotected security zones easily and also achieve complete
physical isolation of key management and data zones inside the
single FPGA. The first version of the processor implemented
in Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGA device achieves the frequency of 160
MHz and it occupies 1343 configurable logic blocks and 21
embedded memory blocks.
Keywords-HCrypt; secured crypto-processor; register sepa-
ration; key management;
I. INTRODUCTION
Hardware cryptographic systems must fulfill contradictory
requirements: fast parallel structures implementing compu-
tationally extensive cryptographic functions must co-exist
with complex sequential structures used to implement cryp-
tographic algorithms such as cipher modes, key management
operations and cryptographic protocols. Implementation of
cryptographic algorithms and protocols in hardware necessi-
tates employing many complex state machines that make the
logic very unstable and vulnerable. Furthermore, upgrades
of a hardwired logic can become complicated, long and
expensive. Because of this, cryptographic systems based
on processor/coprocessor architectures were frequently em-
ployed in the past.
The most common solution employed in the past decade
consists in the use of a general-purpose processor featuring
one or more cryptographic co-processors. This solution
permits to implement sequential algorithms (that evolve very
frequently as a consequence of attacks and/or algorithm
standard modifications) by the processor program, while the
tasks that can be executed in parallel are implemented in
the co-processor placed inside the same logic device. The
biggest part of this research has been devoted to elliptic
curve cryptography [1], [2]. A lot of attention has also been
given to optimizations in symmetric key cryptography (block
cipher coprocessors) [3], [4]. Combined cryptographic sys-
tem based on NIOS II processor with ECC, SHA-1, RSA
and AES co-processors has been proposed by Hani et al.
[5].
Some architectures employ a general-purpose processor
that is modified and optimized for implementation of cryp-
tographic algorithms. Wu et al. [6] and Pereira et al. [7]
used several processors based on Very-Long-Instruction-
Word (VLIW) architecture, while profiting from parallelism
to some extent. Other way for optimizing execution of cryp-
tographic algorithms is to use a configurable architecture.
The most common reconfigurable processors are COBRA
[8], PipeRench [9], MorphoSys [10], GARP [11] and Xtensa
[12].
The use of processors brings a security weakness in all
of the above mentioned solutions: the processor manipulates
the keys as ordinary data and modification (intentional or
unintentional) of the program memory contents can enable
reading the keys in clear outside the system. In [13] authors
use two processors with different security level and different
tasks. They create virtual zones inside a physical memory
that is shared by both processors, in order to be able to
separate red and black zones dedicated to key and data
storage, respectively. The secure specific-purpose processor
can access both private (red) and public (black) virtual zones
and the general-purpose processor is allowed to access only
public (black) virtual zone. However, both zones are located
in the same physical memory thus still allowing certain types
of remote attacks, such as protocol attacks [14].
In order to face protocol attacks and fault injection attacks,
we propose a new architectural concept of the crypto-
processor that allows physical separation of data and key
registers and buses. The data flow between the embedded
cipher and key and data registers is designed so that the
confidential keys generated inside the system will never
leave it in clear, even if the processor was subject of a
protocol (modification of the program code) or fault injection
attack (modification of the data flow).
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces
application background of the global multi-processor system
on chip containing the crypto-processor. Section III presents
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the novel architecture of the crypto-processor. Section IV
describes the implementation of the processor in FPGA.
Results are presented in Section V. Section VI discusses
the results and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. GENERAL CONTEXT AND COMMUNICATION NEEDS
Embedded systems including Multi-Processor Systems
on Chip (MPSoC) are employed increasingly in applica-
tions needing higher security levels [15], [16]. The crypto-
processor described in this paper is proposed as a construc-
tion element of such a Secured Multi-Processor System-on-
Chip (MPSoC). This system is studied with the objective of
improving the security shield of reconfigurable technologies
such as FPGAs at logical, architectural and system levels.
A. Architecture of the System
It is supposed that the proposed MPSoC will contain at
least three types of processors (see Fig. 1): one or more
general-purpose application processors, one or more crypto-
processors and one security processor responsible for recon-
figuration of the system. Besides processors, the system will
include internal and external memories and one or more data
interfaces such as Ethernet, USB, serial interface, etc. The
architecture should be modular and sufficiently general in or-
der to fulfill various security and performance requirements
in numerous applications such as Set-top boxes, software
radios, security video systems etc..
FPGA
Processor 2HCrypt
Reconfiguration
Processor
Processor 1
Shared
Memory
Processing
IPs
USB
Ethernet
Serial port
External
Memory
DDR
Flash
Figure 1: General system architecture
B. Communication Protocol
In order to maintain high order of modularity and con-
nectivity to external networks, the embedded processors
are supposed to communicate between them using network
protocol and packets. The crypto-processor is responsible for
ciphering (or deciphering) internal and external data frames
coming via the communication ports. The ports for plaintext
and ciphertext packets are separated.
III. HCRYPT: A NOVEL CONCEPT OF
CRYPTO-PROCESSORS
Next, we will describe our novel concept of a secure
crypto-processor called HCrypt.
A. Processor Structure and Data Flow
General principle of the processor is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Dedicated architecture is composed of two sets of registers
and buses: common data register set connected to common
data bus and dedicated key data register set connected to
dedicated key data bus.
The keys are saved in clear in key data registers. When
reading the key from a key register, the key data is enci-
phered before being saved in general-purpose data registers.
In the same way, key blocks manipulated as cipher-text are
deciphered before being saved in the key memory. This way,
the key data can never leave the processor in clear (even by
modifying anyhow the program of the processor). Session
key management is illustrated in the Fig. 3.
The key data memory is a true dual port memory. In
this memory, the keys are accessible as data using one
bi-directional port for reading and writing after cipher-
ing/deciphering (as mentioned before), but also as effec-
tive encryption/authentication keys (in clear) during encryp-
tion/decryption process via one dedicated one-directional
port. Note that this second port is independent from the data
buses (common or key data bus).
At least, two session keys and master keys are available
in the proposed processor: one for data (and key) encipher-
ing/deciphering and one for data (and key) authentication.
While manipulating ordinary data, the session keys will be
used. When manipulating the session keys, the master keys
will be used.
The processor contains a true-random number generator
that is used to generate session keys. Note that before saving
the key to the key data registers, the generated random data
is post-processed by deciphering the generated block using
a master key.
The processor contains also two blocks guaranteeing
the flexibility: the program memory block and the ci-
pher/decipher block. The contents of the program memory
could be eventually changed using the security processor
from Section II that is responsible for the system reconfig-
uration. We recall that the cipher/decipher is considered as
a black box in this architecture and that it does not have
a direct impact on the control logic and the data flow. The
processor can thus use any encryption/decryption algorithm,
with selected side-channel attack countermeasures.
B. Instruction Set
Besides common instructions, the instruction set takes
advantage of the processor specific structure. Namely, it uses
different instructions for handling ordinary data and keys.
Also, arithmetic and logic instructions are optimized for
implementing common cryptographic functions and modes.
The instruction set is be divided into four main groups:
• Data transfer instructions: data manipulation between
data registers and input/output FIFOs
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Figure 2: Concept of HCrypt
• Instructions for key generation and transport between
ordinary data registers and key data registers
• Data processing instructions: optimized for implemen-
tation of cipher modes and key management
• Control instructions: aimed at the program control
(branching)
The proposed instruction set with respect to this grouping
is shown in Tab. I.
C. Assembler - Compiler
Complex instruction set makes writing programs in ma-
chine code more difficult. Long machine code is only hardly
readable. In order to address this issue, we developed a
processor-specific assembler (compiler) tool. In the case of
the processor in development, frequent changes in hardware
architecture (changes in instruction set) impose frequent
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Figure 3: Session key management (left: encryption and
transmission, right: reception and decryption)
changes in assembler. For this reason, we decided to define
the instruction set of the assembler in an easy to read sep-
arate text file that is taken into account during compilation.
D. Examples of Execution of Basic Modes
The operation of the processor can be illustrated on
the program examples in Tab. II that realize various basic
encryption modes. In this table, PTI means plaintext input,
PTO plaintext output, CTI ciphertext input and CTO cipher-
text output.
1) CBC Encryption Block Cipher Mode Example: The
code illustrated in Tab. II (part A) enables to encrypt the
packet consisting of N 128-bit data blocks (N is given in
the first data block in the packet) in the CBC mode (see
NIST SP 800-38A, p. 10 [17]).
2) CFB Encryption Block Cipher Mode Example: The
code illustrated in Tab. II (part B) enables to generate the
session key that is then used to encrypt the packet consisting
of N 128-bit data blocks (N is given in the first data block
in the packet) in the CFB mode (see NIST SP 800-38A, p.
12 [17]).
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Table I: The dedicated instruction set
A) Data transfer instructions
Instruction Description
init #,rx Initialize Rx with a constant
getpt rx Get one block from plain-text input FIFO and put it to Rx
putpt rx Put data from data reg. Rx to the plain-text output FIFO
getct rx Get one block from cipher-text input FIFO to data register Rx
putct rx Put data from data register Rx to cipher-text output FIFO
move rx, ry Move the contents of data register Rx to data register Ry
B) Instructions for key generation and manipulation
Instruction Description
genk kx Generate the key and save it in the key data register Kx
getk rx, ky Decipher encrypted key from data reg. Rx to key reg. Ky
putk kx, ry Encipher the key from key reg. Kx to data reg. Ry
C) Data processing instructions
Instruction Description
enc rx,ry Encipher the contents of Rx and save it in Ry
xor rx,ry Rx XOR Ry and save the result in Ry
dcr rx Decrement Rx
clr rx Clear Rx
cmp rx, ry Compare Rx with Ry, set the flag Z accordingly
D) Control instructions
Instruction Description
goto displ Unconditional branching
bneq displ Conditional branching if not equal (Z = 0)
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF HCRYPT
A. Specifications
As previously mentioned, the objective is to physically
separate registers and buses carrying keys from those car-
rying data. For this reason, two sets of registers are imple-
mented, so that keys and data are stored separately. In order
to achieve higher performance, the processor has a 128-bit
datapath.
HCrypt exchanges data with external/internal environ-
ment using input/output FIFOs. The processor is able to
implement a serial communication protocol using packets.
It permits to analyze and create packets efficiently. Data
processing operations needed for implementation of cipher
modes are carried out in a special-purpose arithmetic logic
unit (ALU) that constitutes an important part of the proces-
sor.
For security reasons, the key lifetime should be limited
(the same key should be used only for a limited amount of
data). One of adopted solutions is to use two hierarchical
key levels: master keys and session keys. The session keys
are used to encrypt data and they are generated inside
the system. In order to enable data decryption, the session
key has to be exchanged with the communication party.
Table II: Block encryption modes
A) CBC encryption mode
getpt r3 ;Get N from PTI→R3
getpt r1 ;Get IV from PTI→R1
putct r1 ;Send IV to CTO
cbce: getpt r2 ;Get data block from PTI→R2
xor r1, r2 ;R1 XOR R2→R2
enc r2, r1 ;Encipher R2→R1
putct r1 ;R1→CTO
dcr r3 ;Decrement R3 (R3 - 1→R3)
bneq cbce ;Branch to cbce if not zero
B) CFB encryption mode
genk kx ;Generate new session key
putk kx, r1 ;Encipher session key and put it to R1
putct r1 ;Send session key to CTO
getpt r3 ;Get N from PTI→R3
getpt r1 ;Get IV from PTI→R1
putct r1 ;Send IV from R1 to CTO
cfbe: enc r1, r2 ;Encipher R1→R2
getpt r1 ;Get plain-text block from PTI→R1
xor r2, r1 ;R2 XOR R1→R1
putct r1 ;Put R1 to CTO
dcr r3 ;Decrement R3 (R3 - 1→R3)
bneq cfbe ;Branch to cfbe if not zero
It is therefore encrypted by the master key (shared with
the party) and sent together with encrypted data. In order
to generate keys inside the system, true random number
generator (TRNG) is embedded in the processor.
Although the cipher/decipher blocks should be included in
the processor’s datapath, they are considered as black boxes
in our project. We used AES cipher and decipher for testing
purposes.
B. Design of the HCrypt Processor
The crypto-processor consists of the following parts:
• Datapath
− Data manipulation part
− Key management part
− Key generation part - TRNG
• Control logic
• Input/Output FIFOs
1) Datapath: The datapath is the most area- and
performance-critical path of the crypto-processor. It consists
of data bus, data registers and ALU. Data registers are
implemented in four 32 bits wide true dual-port RAM
blocks. They are accessible through two 128-bit data ports.
The ALU has a 128-bit datapath. It carries out all arithmetic
and logic operations (XOR, AND, NOT, CMP, ROR, ROL,
CLR, INC, DEC, ADD, SUB) necessary for implementation
of most encryption/decryption modes. The authentication
modes are not taken into account, yet.
Key data bus and key data registers for the key man-
agement are shown in Fig. 2. The Master key (aimed at
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Session key encryption/decryption) is stored in the Master
key register. This register is capable of storing two 128-bit
keys: one for encryption and one for decryption. This register
is implemented in the logic area of the FPGA. Before the
operation, the master key has to be transferred to the crypto-
processor via a 32-bit separated data bus by the Security
processor from Session II.
Session key registers are implemented using two 128-
bit dual-port RAM blocks. Session keys can be generated
inside the processor using embedded TRNG or they can be
received by the crypto-processor in an encrypted form and
subsequently decrypted using the master key. If generated
inside the processor, the session key has to be encrypted
using a master key and sent out according to the protocol.
Note that multiplexers included in the datapath are or-
ganized in such a way, that unintentional or intentional
transfers of unencrypted keys outside the crypto-processor
would never be possible.
The cipher and decipher blocks that implement the AES
encryption algorithm in their current version, are con-
nected to the processor from outside. The keys and data
are transported to them by two separate 128-bit buses.
Encrypted/decrypted data are registered in cipher/decipher
blocks in 128-bit registers accessible by the processor.
This first version of the datapath is partially optimized for
the Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGA. In the future, further optimiza-
tions will be carried out and authentication will be imple-
mented. In addition, the crypto-processor will be optimized
for other FPGA technologies as well.
2) Control Logic: The first version of the control logic is
responsible for instruction fetching, decoding and execution.
Instructions are carried out in 2, 3, 6 or more clock cycles,
depending on the type and complexity of the operation. The
pipelining is not implemented. However, it is supposed to
be implemented in the future. Instructions are 32-bit wide.
Current instruction set consists of 32 instructions.
The program is stored in the program memory that is
initialized by an external 32-bit interface. The program
memory is implemented as one dual port RAM block
capable of storing 1024 instructions. The program memory
can be expanded if necessary (by concatenating two or more
memory blocks).
3) Input/Output FIFOs: There are four input/output FI-
FOs in the current version of the processor. They serve as
input/output data ports, which convert 32-bit data words into
128-bit words used inside the crypto-processor and vice
versa. Additionally, the FIFOs allow interfacing external
clock domains with the internal clock domain of crypto-
processor.
V. RESULTS
HCrypt was described in VHDL language using Xilinx
ISE Web ver. 11.1 and implemented in Xilinx Virtex 5
XC5VLX110T FPGA. System utilizes just fine-grain FPGA
Table III: Utilization of resources in XC5VLX110T
Slices RAM(36kb)/FIFO
Total 17280 100.0% 148 100.0%
Crypto-Proc. 1343 7.7% 21 14.2%
AES Cipher 286 1.6% 9 6.1%
AES Decipher 361 2.1% 9 6.1%
resources and embedded RAMs/FIFOs as illustrated in Tab.
III. Functionality was simulated using Xilinx ISim tool.
Subsequently, timing simulation was carried out. The period
estimated from the longest critical path was 6.45 ns, thus the
highest clock frequency was 155 MHz.
The crypto-processor was then tested in Virtex 5
XC5VLX110T FPGA using the XUPII development board.
In the first stage of tests, the processor was initialized by
the master key and the program. Afterwards, data packets
were written into the input plain-text FIFO. Next, the crypto-
processor carried out encryption in the CFB128 AES en-
cryption mode and the resulting packets were written to the
ciphertext output FIFO. A stable operation has been achieved
at the clock frequency up to 160 MHz, thus confirming
estimations.
Assembler compiler tool with configurable instruction set
was also developed. Various short programs were written for
testing purposes. Assembler was tested by compiling source
code for HCrypt. No compilation errors were observed.
VI. DISCUSSION
The main difficulty concerning the portability of the
proposed VHDL code concerns embedded memory employ-
ment. As mentioned above, current processor was mapped
to Xilinx Virtex 5 device where each true dual port memory
block has two 32-bit input and output ports. However, in
Altera Stratix III FPGA each true dual port memory block
has two 16-bit input and output ports, thus twice more
memory blocks have to be instantiated in order to maintain
the same width of the datapath (128-bit). Moreover, when
adapting to Actel Fusion or SmartFusion devices, where
each embedded true dual port memory block has two 8-
bit input and output ports, 16 memory block have to be
instantiated to maintain the same width of the datapath.
It has been observed that current cipher and decipher
blocks constitute the longest critical path, therefore opti-
mization of the cipher can result in better performance. Some
long critical paths were also reported in the ALU, thus this
part has to be optimized in the future as well.
Resource distribution report showed that the most logic
resources are dedicated to ALU. On the contrary, the most
embedded RAM blocks were used for Input/Output FIFO
instantiations, in order to interconnect 32-bit external buses
with 128-bit internal datapath with different clocks.
In the current version, only basic encryption block cipher
modes are supported [17]. Flexibility of the architecture al-
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lows its further extension, in order to implement new authen-
tication modes (such as CMAC) and combined encryption
and authentication modes (such as CCM and GCM).
To support a future discussion, HCrypt project is available
on the SecReSoC project webpage: http://labh-curien.univ-
st-etienne.fr/secresoc/
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a novel architecture of the crypto-processor
with secured key management. The architecture is based on
physical separation of registers and buses aimed at key man-
agement from registers and buses aimed at data exchange
and data processing. The physical separation of the processor
blocks increases its robustness against protocol and fault in-
jection attacks. Cipher and decipher blocks are independent
from the processor structure and can be easily upgraded or
secured by including side-channel countermeasures. Internal
structure of the processor and its arithmetic-logic unit are
optimized for cipher modes implementation enabling all the
necessary mathematical operations. Moreover, the processor
can easily analyze and create packets needed in communi-
cation protocols and it is thus suitable as a component in
multi-processor networks. In order to achieve higher level
of data security, only two-level symmetric-key management
have been considered up to now. Nevertheless, the structure
of the processor will be soon extended in order to support
also the asymmetric key cryptography.
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